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Abstract
The relationship between HRM practices and perceived firm performance was analyzed in
3,281 firms located in European Union countries using data derived from the Cranet data set.
A factor analysis of 80 different HRM practices resulted in 15 bundles of HRM practices
which were then further categorized as being either “calculative”, “collaborative” or
“intermediary”. While controlling for contingency factors, firm strategy, firm size, market
conditions and degree of unionization, as well as controlling for industry and country, the
resulting analysis indicates that while five of the six calculative practices and two of the three
intermediary practices have a significant impact on performance none of the six collaborative
practices has. Significantly it was further noted that the overall effect of HRM on performance
was relatively modest.
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Introduction
Among human resource practitioners, the term “strategic human resource management” is
generally used to signal the view that human resource management (HRM) practices should
enhance organisational performance, not least in financial terms (Schuler and Jackson, 2005).
Paralleling this, numerous theorists have argued that the human resources of the firm are
potentially a powerful source of sustainable competitive advantage for organisations, and
have sought to demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between HRM and firm
performance (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Arthur, 1994; Pfeffer, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Guest,
1997; Ferris et al., 1999). However, since the concept of strategic HRM was launched in the
mid 1970s, there has been uncertainty as to which of the many “high performance” HRM
practices (Delany et al., 1989) actually facilitate superior performance (Ferris et al., 1999;
Collins and Smith, 2006).
Authors such as Walton (1985), Arthur (1994), Gooderham et al. (1999) have
proposed that one can distinguish between two generic categories of HRM practices. On the
one hand there are those practices that are referred to as control or calculative HRM practices
such as performance-related pay that emphasize quantifiable exchanges between the firm and
the employer. On the other hand, there are those practices that are labelled commitment-based
or collaborative such as employee strategy briefings that aim to foster employer-employee
mutuality of interest. It is important to note that the calculative and collaborative HRM
categories are not intended to embrace each and every HRM practice. Thus there are HRM
practices that fall outside these two categories. Without intending to suggest a continuum
between calculative and collaborative HRM (Gooderham, et al., 1999) we will refer to those
4practices that cannot be readily categorized in terms of the two generic categories as
“intermediary” practices.
The primary aim of this study is to compare the impact of bundles of both calculative
and collaborative HRM practices on firm performance. Thus a consideration of the impact of
“intermediary” practices is largely of secondary interest to this paper.
Past research in this area has mostly focused on the US rather than Europe. The
exceptions have invariably focussed on single European countries. Thus Archimoles (1997)
examined the relationship between HRM and organisational performance in French
organisations, Boselie, Paauwe and Jansen (2001) investigated the association between HRM
practices and firm performance in the Netherlands and Guest et al. (2003) investigated the
association between HRM and corporate performance in the UK. One study that has
examined a number of European countries is that of Stavrou and Brewster (2005), but this
study treated Europe as one homogeneous setting and did not take into account national
differences. Thus studies that include the broader European setting in the sense of a variety of
different European settings have to date not featured in HRM-performance research. This
study aims at addressing this dearth by spanning firms located across 16 European Union
(EU) countries across a range of industries.
To summarize, the significance of this paper is three-fold. First, it addresses the key
question within strategic HRM, i.e. the extent to which HRM practices influence firm
performance. Second, it does this on the basis of a comprehensive range of both calculative
and collaborative bundles of practices. Third, it draws on firm data that spans a wide-range of
European countries. As such this paper constitutes a major testing of the core notion within
strategic HRM.
5HRM and Firm Performance
There is a growing literature on the impact of HRM practices on organisational performance.
This literature is commonly underpinned by the resource-based view of the firm with its
emphasis on gaining sustainable competitive advantage by means of effective and efficient
utilisation of the resources of the organisation (Paauwe, 2004). That is successful
organisations are those which have acquired and utilised valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable resources, including human resources (Barney 1991, 1995; Barney and Wright,
1998). Thus for example Wright and McMahan (1992) discussed the importance of human
resources in the creation of competitive advantage, while Wright, McMahan and McWilliams
(1994) suggested that while human resources are always a potential source of sustained
competitive advantage not all organisations have the ability to systematically develop these
through the use of HRM practices. Similarly Huselid (1995) and Pfeffer (1995) have used the
resource-based view as a basis for examining the impact of human resource development on
firm performance. Summarizing, Guthrie (200:181) noted that “the common theme in the
literature is an emphasis on utilising a system of management practices giving employees
skills, information, motivation and latitude and resulting in a workforce that is a source of
competitive advantage.”
The literature on HRM and performance can be divided into three main kinds of
theories (Delery and Doty, 1996), universalistic, contingency and configurational. We will
initially focus on the universalistic and configurational approaches, attending to the
contingency approach in the next section. Universalistic theories, such as those developed by
Huselid, (1995), Osterman (1994) and Pfeffer (1994) are concerned with “best practice” and
work on the underlying assumption that there is an association or linear relationship between
HRM practices and organisational performance, that “best practices” are generalizable and
that organisational success is best measured in terms of financial performance. Universalistic
6theorists have in general employed individual HRM practices and have analyzed the
relationship between individual HRM activities and performance. An overview of these
studies can be found in Boselie, Paauwe and Jansen (2001). One notable example is Pfeffer
(1994) who identified a series of sixteen HRM practices that he argues will lead to improved
performance, including employment security, selectivity in recruiting, high wages, incentive
pay, employee ownership, information sharing, participation and empowerment and training
and skill development in firms in general. Another is Delaney and Huselid (1996) who
examined and generally confirmed the impact of seven “progressive” HRM practices,
including training and incentive compensation, on organizational performance.
However as Alcázar et al., 2005 point out there are also universalistic approaches in
which more than one HRM practice is combined thereby building so-called “High
Performance Works Systems”. One example is Guthrie (2001) who measured companies’ use
of high involvement work practices and found that utilising these can enhance organisational
competitiveness. Guest et al. (2003) in their study of HRM in UK companies identified 48
single, HRM practices drawing these primarily from the existing “high-commitment” HRM
literature. These items were grouped into “nine main areas of HRM” (Guest et al., 2003: 297)
including training and development and appraisal. Initial factor analysis of these nine
aggregate HRM practices, “revealed no coherent factors” (p.301). Therefore to create a
measure of the overall human resource system, a measure was derived by combining mean
scores across the nine practices. Guest et al. (2003) found partial support for an association
between the greater use of HRM practices and lower reported labour turnover and for higher
profit per employee but found no support for an association between HRM and higher
productivity. Huselid’s (1995) approach also involved the combination of HRM practices,
combining a number of practices into “High Performance Works Systems”. Factor analyzing
13 HRM practices he identified two factors, “employee skills and organizational structures”
7and “employee motivation”. He found that these were significantly related to turnover,
organizational productivity and financial performance. In short, within the universalistic
approach to HRM and performance it is becoming common to group or combine practices in
order to create more coherent explanations of the HRM-performance link.
Central to the configurational perspective, is the argument that the impact of HRM on
organisational performance is dependent on the adoption of an effective combination of HRM
practices, often referred to as HRM bundles (MacDuffie, 1995). Thus the configurational
approach has as its basis that maximizing firm performance is dependent on the bundling
together of interrelated elements of HRM practices in an internally consistent manner.
Configurational theories propose that the relationship between HRM and performance
involves complex interactions between bundles of HRM activities and outcomes (Arthur,
1994; MacDuffie, 1996). Such bundles of complementary practices are held to produce
substantially greater performance effects than individual HRM practices (Ichniowski et al.,
1997). Ichniowski et al. (1997) explained that interaction effects among HRM policies are
important determinants of productivity so firms realise the largest improvements in
productivity by adopting bundles or clusters of complementary practices rather than making
changes to single practices. Although there are firm-specific variants of the configurational
approach, at its simplest “the configurational argument is based on the assumption that (HRM
bundles) are ideal types that are equally effective under all conditions” (Delery and Doty,
1996: 812). Thus for example Kalleberg and Moody (1994) found a tendency for
performance enhancing HRM policies and practices to occur together, thereby creating high
performance work systems. Likewise both Arthur (1994) and Becker and Huselid (1998)
found support for the potential impact of systems or bundles of HRM practices on
organisational performance.
8Alcázar et al., 2005 argue that configurational bundles must not be confused with
universalistic bundles or systems because while the former consists of holistic patterns of
interrelated, synergistic practices, the latter comprises single practices combined in an
additive manner. In other words the configurational approach involves more complex
typologies of ideal types of HRM systems than found in universalistic approaches. We would
argue that this definition is too simplistic and does not always fit with past uses of these two
approaches. For example while Guest et al.’s (2003) measure of the overall HRM system is
primarily additive, Huselid’s (1995) bundles clearly cannot be construed as being additive in
their construction. Thus we would argue that certain variants of universalistic bundling and
configurational bundling represent closely related approaches that are problematic to
distinguish. Groups of HR practices combined additively may clearly be universalistic but the
identification of a configurational approach may be more problematic. Terminology aside,
the important lesson from this literature is that combining HR practices in a fashion that
promotes internal consistency is a better approach to that of simply adding individual effects.
In support of this we may note that in their single practices universalistic study Delaney and
Huselid (1996), reflecting on Huselid’s (1995) use of bundles, stress that examining bundles
or clusters of HRM practices is theoretically preferable to studying the effects of individual
practices precisely because of an assumption of complementarities or synergies among a
firm’s HRM practices. That is Delaney and Huselid (1996:955) view “HRM systems rather
than individual practices as the appropriate level of analysis when an estimate of the firm-
level effect of HRM practices is desired.” This outlook is reiterated by Laursen and Foss
(2003:249) who argue that we should, because of potential complementarities between related
practices, expect that HRM practices are most conducive to performance when adopted, not in
isolation, but as a system of mutually reinforcing practices.
9In other words there is a broad consensus that when assessing the impact of HRM on
firm performance a bundling approach is preferable with certain variants of the universalistic
bundling approach and the simpler configurational bundling approaches indistinguishable
from one another.
Calculative and Collaborative HRM
When addressing the impact of HRM on firm performance, it is important to observe
that HRM has evolved from two distinct conceptions of the link between employee
motivation and firm-level outcomes. Walton (1985) suggested that a distinction can be drawn
between the control and commitment approaches to HRM. Arthur (1994) argues that the
control approach to HRM seeks to improve efficiency by enforcing employee compliance by,
for example, basing employee rewards on some measurable criteria. In contrast, commitment
approaches to HRM aim to shape attitudes by forging psychological links between
organisational and employee goals. This division has been further discussed by Legge (1995).
Empirical studies have largely been confined to assessing the impact of commitment-
based practices on firm performance with a number of authors observing a relationship
between commitment-based HRM practices and firm performance (Arthur, 1994; MacDuffie,
1994; Youndt et al., 1996; Bowen and Ostroff, 1996; Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000; Collins
and Clark, 2003). More recently Collins and Smith (2006) analyzed the impact of
commitment-based HRM practices on organisational performance, and found that an increase
in these practices led to an increase in both sales from new products and services and sales
growth. As with so many previous studies Collins and Smith only examined the role of
commitment-based HRM practices in relation to firm performance and did not include
control-based practices. Acknowledging this they argue that there is a need for studies that
combine both control and commitment-based HRM practices. One exception is that of Arthur
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(1994) who examined the impact of both control and commitment-based HRM practices.
However, Arthur’s study was confined to one single industry, steel mills, in only one country,
the United States.
Gooderham et al (1999) has redefined the distinction as being that between calculative HRM
practices – aimed at the efficient use of human resources – and collaborative practices –
aimed at promoting the goals of both employees and employer. The term ‘calculative’ should
not be taken as entirely interchangeable with Walton’s ‘control’ factors. While similar,
calculative HRM is defined by GOoderham et alas that designed to promote the efficient use
of HRM in general rather than to promote employee compliance. Therefore practices that
also encourage efficiency within the HR function such as HR evaluation or training
monitoring are also included along with those that promote employee efficiency. The
calculative approach is clearly represented in Fombrun et al’s (1984) “Michigan Model” that
emphasized that superior firm performance is dependent on having in place systems for the
regular assessment of individual employees. Associated with and reinforcing these systems
are performance rewards and training whose performance-related outcomes are monitored.
The collaborative model of enhancing firm performance is clearly apparent in Beer et al.’s
“Harvard Model”, which emphasized the need for management to recognise employees as
significant stakeholders in the enterprise. At the core of this model is the conception of the
centrality of employee influence and the common sense of purpose it engenders for firm
performance. Employee influence is contingent on there being processes of mutual influence
between management and employees that enable management to comprehend employee
interests. Without such processes, employee intrinsic motivation is undermined thereby
giving rise to employee resentment and distrust, which results in unwillingness to take
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responsibility for the performance of the firm. Rather than one single system of employee
involvement techniques, Beer et al. propose that several approaches, such as employee
briefings and work system design, be used. The notion of HRM being used to develop
employee commitment is also central to Guest’s (1997) theory of normative HRM. By
contrast, our study is a full-fledged response to Collins and Smith’s call in that we will
examine the impact of various bundles of calculative and collaborative HRM practices on
firm performance across a variety of industries in the context of a variety of countries. In
addition, we will examine the role of a number of contextual factors in this relationship. By
including this combination of variables, we are able to make a significant contribution to the
literature in this area.
Our first hypothesis draws primarily on the universalistic approach which indicates that both
calculative and collaborative HRM practices improve firm performance. However, because
we adopt a bundling approach we are also drawing on variants of the configurational
approach.
H1: Both calculative and collaborative bundles of HRM practices will positively impact firm
performance.
It has been contended that universalistic theories in particular fail to take into account firm
context, a critique that has given rise to the third of Delery and Doty’s (1996) approaches,
contingency theorization, characterised by the explicit rejection of the universal applicability
of HRM practices. For example Schuler and Jackson (1997) argue that in order to be
effective, an organisation’s HRM policies must be consistent with key aspects of the
organisation. Thus the contingency perspective supposes that the relationship between HRM
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practices and performance will vary according to various external and internal influences. One
central tenet of contingency theory is that HRM practices can only have a positive impact on
performance if they are consistent with an organization’s strategy (Alcázar et al., 2005). In
addition contingency theorisation has also considered the conditioning impact of a number of
external and internal organizational factors. In terms of the former industry membership and
firm-level market conditions are regarded as particularly significant (Alcázar et al., 2005). In
terms of the latter Schuler and Jackson (1995) argue that a number of internal contextual
factors such as firm size and firm strategy must be taken into account. In addition Brewster
(1995) argues that union involvement must be taken into consideration.
Thus, in short the contingency approach advocates that our analysis of HRM and
performance should include a range of firm internal factors including firm size, level of
unionization and generic firm strategy as well the external influence of market conditions. In
addition it suggests we should control for possible effects of industry membership.
H2: The effects of calculative and collaborative bundles of HRM practices will be contingent
on both firm internal and external factors.
Method
Our study is based on cross-sectional data derived from the 1999 Cranet survey of HRM in 16
European countries. The overall strategy of the survey was to mail appropriately translated
questionnaires to human resource managers in representative national samples of firms with
more than one hundred employees. By firms we mean establishments rather than companies
which may for example in the case of conglomerates or holding companies contain more than
one firm. Problems in ensuring that the selection and interpretation of topic areas was not
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biased by one country's approach, as well as problems related to the translation of concepts
and questions, were largely overcome by close collaboration between business schools
located in each country (for a detailed description of the Cranet approach, see Brewster et al,
1996). Although the response rate for the individual countries is relatively low, mostly
between 20 and 35 per cent, analyses of previous Cranet surveys suggest that the net sample
represents the population in a satisfactory manner (Brewster et al, 1994).
Our sample consists of 3,281 for-profit firms. Table 1 summarizes the country distribution of
the sample.
_________________
Table 1 About Here
________________
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, firm performance, is based on a question as to whether gross
revenue over the past three years has been well in excess of costs or not. We noted that of the
3,281 firms, 46 percent replied positively to this question. While we acknowledge that this is
a subjective evaluation of performance by respondents it is noteworthy that research by
Smith, Tyson and Brough (2005) on the Cranet survey data within the UK has substantially
validated the results of this question by comparing these responses to what is indicated by
objective data on financial performance. Arguably this is unsurprising in that an extensive
review by Wall et al. (2004) comparing the validity between objective and self-report
measures of firm performance found in all the cases they examined convergent construct
validity between the two measures.
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Independent Variables
The items contained in Cranet are derived from a comprehensive review of the literature on
HRM practices that are considered to relate to firm performance. In all, Cranet includes 80
such variables. Our factor analysis using principal component factoring with Varimax
Rotation in SPSS 14.0 was based on 61 indicators of HRM practices. The factors were saved
using the Anderson-Rubin method in SPSS. As shown in Table 2 a total of 15 factors were
identified that together explains about 62 percent of the variance of the 61 indicators. 1 These
factors or HRM bundles are essentially replications of bundles identified by Stavrou and
Brewster (2005) in their exploratory analysis of the Cranet data set.
Of these 15 bundles six can clearly be grouped as calculative practices (bundles 1-6) in
that they are bundles of practices that can be described as “efficiency seeking” (Gooderham,
Nordhaug and Ringdal, 1999, p.510) and involve assessing or rewarding aspects of
performance either at the individual or at the group level (e.g. training monitoring could be
described as assessing performance at the group level). Seven bundles can be grouped as
collaborative practices (7-11, 14) in that they involve stimulating employee commitment
through cooperation or communication. The results of the PCA also included three bundles –
career development, wider jobs and downsizing methods – that did not fit clearly within
1 The exploratory factor analysis extracts as many factors as there are variables. Two criteria
are used for a parsimonious solution: i) Kaiser’s criterion where an eigenvalue of 1 is the
cutting point; ii) an examination of the scree plot and making a cut when there is a significant
decline in eigenvalue to the next potential factor and the line in the plot flattens. In our case
the next potential factor had an eigenvalue of 1.004, just at the Kaiser’s criterion, but there is
a significant jump in the eigenvalues from around 1.3 for factor 15 and to 1.0 for factor 16.
Thus, we decided to accept the 15 factor solution, which is consistent with Stavrou and
Brewster (2005). The next step is to examine the pattern of factor loadings. The indicators
load strongly on the expected factors with no exceptions as Table 2 shows. The “off-diagonal”
factor loadings are omitted from Table 2 for reasons of space. This information is important in
evaluating the factor solution. The indicators should ideally show high loadings on the factor,
and low loadings on other factors. In fact, there are only two such "off-diagonal" factor
loadings that exceed 0.3. One indicator with the highest loading on factor 11 also shows a
loading of 0.41 on factor 14. Another indicator of factor 11 loads 0.33 on factor 14.
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Gooderham et al’s definition of calculative and collaborative practices. As they had no
common theme they will simply be referred to as ‘intermediary’ bundles.
_________________
Table 2 About Here
________________
In terms of the contingency analysis internal factors are represented by firm size,
unionization and two indicators of firm strategy. Firm-size is captured using the natural
logarithm of the number of employees in the firm and level of unionization in the firm is
measured as a percentage. In regard to firm strategy we have controlled for the importance
contra unimportance of two types of generic firm strategy, competing on the basis of cost
leadership, that is price, and competing on the basis of differentiation, that is quality (Porter,
1980). In addition we include a key firm external factor, market conditions. This indicator is
a dichotomous variable distinguishing firms that are selling into growing markets contra those
which are not.
Our analysis also includes two control variables that together provide the broad macro-
context our sample of firms is operating within. The first of these is the country of location.
This enables us to control for differences in institutional settings as well as national economic
conditions both of which may influence firm performance. Additionally, the data may be seen
as clustered by country, and this needs to be controlled for in the design. Therefore, we
employ a fixed effects model with dummy indicators for all countries except the UK, which is
the reference country. This implies that the levels of firm performance may vary among the
countries, but that the effects of the other explanatory variables are assumed to be similar.
It is also important to control for variations in firm performance that are ascribable to
industry membership. Therefore our second control variable is industry. Our classification
distinguishes manufacturing, construction, transport, personnel services and a remaining
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category for all other industries. In our analysis manufacturing serves as the reference
category.
Finally, we have also included two control variables that reflect the use of numerical
flexibility at the firm-level, i.e. the extent of the use of “part-time” and “temporary”
employees. Firms that make extensive use of numerical flexibility are held to be distinct from
those that make relatively little use of such arrangements in that while the former are
bifurcated into a core-periphery employee groups, the latter constitutes a distinctly more
homogenous environment. These differences are viewed as creating the basis for two distinct
HRM environments (Atkinson, 1985; Gooderham and Nordhaug, 1997), hence the need to
control for this prospect. In order to capture this distinction we have distinguished firms
which have at least eleven percent or more part-time employees from those which have less
than this, and those firms which have at least eleven percent or more temporary employees
from those which have less than this.
Results
We start our analysis by defining a baseline binary logistic regression model of firm
performance with main effects only. The main explanatory variables in this model are the 15
HRM-bundles. In addition the model included a range of contingency firm internal and
external factors and controls: firm-size, level of unionization, firm strategy, market
conditions, industry membership classification, numerical flexibility, and country of location.
In the baseline model, the effects of the HRM-bundles are uniform, in line with the
universalistic approach.
The next step was to add interaction effects implied by the contingency approach in
order to test hypothesis 2. The large number of HRM-bundles and the weak theoretical
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precision in the contingency approach, pointed to analysing sub-samples by levels of variables
derived from the research literature. We tested out the following possible contingency factors;
firm size, unionization, strategy on quality, strategy on price, and market conditions. Since
strategy on quality and on price was measured by separate variables, we separated split on
both quality and price being important for the firm or not.
Finally, in a third step based on the total sample, we added interaction terms for the
contingency variables mentioned above and the HRM-bundles that showed the largest effects
in the baseline model. The results the additional steps indicated no systematic statistically
significant interaction effects in any of these analyses. In effect, the failure to locate
systematic interaction effects means that our second hypothesis has to be rejected.
Therefore, we have chosen to only report the results for the baseline model in Table 3,
as this model clearly is preferable to the more complex alternatives. The Cox & Snell pseudo-
R2 for the baseline model is 0.143.The remaining pseudo-R2s shown at the bottom of Table 3
displays the marginal contributions of two of four control variables, industry and country,
separately. As neither of the two numerical flexibility controls, part-time and temporary work,
had any noteworthy impact on performance their marginal contributions have not been
included. In addition to industry and country Table 3 reports the marginal contributions for
each of the three sets of variables, the contingency variables, the calculative bundles, and the
collaborative and the intermediary bundles. Of these marginal contributions, country of
location is the most important. The second most important contribution is that of the
calculative bundles, followed by the contingency variables. The collaborative bundles, even
when grouped with the intermediary bundles are of relatively little importance. Indeed firm
industry membership is as important as the combination of the collaborative and intermediary
bundles.
_________________
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Table 3 About Here
_______________
Going to the main part of Table 3 we note that with the exception of the “Performance related
pay” bundle, which is significant at the ten percent level, all of the six calculative bundles of
practices have a statistically significant impact on performance at the five percent level.
Furthermore, two of the three intermediary bundles of practices are significant at the five
percent level. In contrast, none of the six bundles of collaborative practices is statistically
significant at the five percent level. Since, the HRM-bundles are measured on the same scale,
their coefficients are directly comparable. The comparison shows that the three most
important calculative HRM-bundles are profit-sharing, group-bonus, and share-options.
In short we find only partial support for H1. Our results indicate that it is primarily the
calculative rather than collaborative bundles of HRM practices that positively impact firm
performance
All of the variables derived from the contingency approach in the model, except for
level of unionization, have statistically significant effects on firm performance. Both of the
two strategy indicators have statistically significant effects, but with different signs. Firms
competing on the basis of price lag behind in performance, whereas those who put an
emphasis on quality enjoy superior performance. Finally, operating in a growing market
enhances firm performance. However, these variables effect performance through their main
effects only and thereby do not lend any systematic support for our second hypothesis which
implies differential effects of the HRM-bundles by levels of the contingency variables.
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Conclusion and discussion
The aim of this paper was to examine the core issue within strategic HRM, the extent
to which HRM practices have a significant impact on firm performance. In doing so, we have
included a far greater range of both calculative and collaborative bundles of practices than
previous studies and drawn on different theoretical approaches to the issue of HRM and firm
performance. Additionally we have drawn on firm data from a far wider range of countries
than earlier studies. Guest (1997: 269) notes that, “the distinctive feature of HRM is its
assumption that improved performance is achieved through the people in the organization.”
Our findings both support and cast some doubt on the value of HRM for firm performance in
the context of Europe in that our findings are different in regard to calculative and
collaborative HRM.
While we found that whereas calculative and intermediary HRM bundles, with
exceptions, generally have some impact on the performance of European firms, collaborative
HRM bundles do not. Thus while our first hypothesis is generally supported in regards to
calculative HRM-bundles of practices, it is clearly not for collaborative bundles. In that H1 is
derived from the universalistic approach and the simplest forms of the configurational
approach these approaches may be considered to have received some measure of support.
The failure to find a relationship between collaborative HRM and performance is in
opposition to previous research such as Arthur (1994) and Guest (1997). We have two
explanations for this. First, unlike previous studies which have concentrated on the impact of
collaborative HRM on performance our study includes a wide range of both calculative as
well as collaborative bundles. Second, unlike previous studies we also include a range of
contingency variables.
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We also included, as dictated by the results of the Principle Components Analysis,
three ‘intermediary’ bundles. Two of these were significantly related to firm performance.
We have therefore added to the previous literature discussing the distinction between
calculative and collaborative HRM practices, through our identification of practices that fall
outside of this distinction. Our findings suggest that the calculative/collaborative dichotomy
may be too simplistic as there are practices that cannot easily be defined as either that have a
significant impact on firm performance. More investigation in to how HRM practices may be
grouped together by type, and the impact of this on firm performance is needed.
Our second hypothesis, that the effects of the HRM-bundles would be contingent on
an interaction with a range of external and internal factors found no support. This does not
necessarily mean that the contingency approach is invalidated. More specific theoretical
reasoning coupled with appropriate data would provide a firmer conclusion.
Our analysis indicates that for European firms the country of location is a relatively
important source of variation in performance. This is unsurprising given the significance of
national economic conditions for performance at the firm-level. Additionally, country of
location may also reflect the efficacy of national business systems at the firm-level. Future
studies should be designed to differentiate between cyclical economic conditions and long-
term institutional conditions. This would require a longitudinal design ideally with several
time points and combining macro-economic data together with the variables we employ in
this study.
Beyond the shortcoming of using cross-sectional data and therefore the difficulty in
determining whether performance for example creates more scope for HRM rather than vice
versa (Guest et al., 2003) there are other limitations to our findings. One is that contextual
factors such as organizational structure and culture have not been controlled for. It has been
argued that such contextual factors may render certain practices or groups of practices largely
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irrelevant in terms of firm performance (Ferris et al, 1999). For example if the structure of a
firm is a highly hierarchical with a bureaucratic culture, it is unlikely that participative HRM
practices would be effective. Another limitation is that it while we do control for generic
strategy we do not test for strategic “fit”. It has been argued that for HRM practices to impact
on performance there must be a particular “fit” between a firm’s HRM practices and the
firm’s competitive strategy (e.g. Wright and Snell, 1991). In other words it may be the case
that the bundles of HRM practices firms in our sample are employing have not been
sufficiently aligned with their strategic goals. A third limitation is that we do not examine for
the horizontal alignment of each firm’s various HRM practices. It has been proposed that
HRM practices must complement one another to achieve positive performance outcomes
(Schuler and Jackson, 1997; Wright and Snell, 1991). Finally, we have not considered the role
of possible mediators, such as organizational climate, that may play a decisive role in the
HRM-firm performance relationship. For example it has been suggested that HRM practices
do not directly impact firm performance but instead contribute to the creation of
organizational climates that foster superior performance (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004; Collins
and Smith, 2006).
Notwithstanding these limitations, we would argue that our findings do place HRM in
a context that is sufficiently broad for us to contend that while certain HRM bundles do have
an impact on performance, this should not be exaggerated. Indeed it is our contention that,
even those bundles that impact on firm performance play only a relatively modest role in
terms of explaining overall performance. The implication for HR practitioners is that
delivering bundles of HRM practices is insufficient per se. Thus in simple terms our findings
indicate that “off-the-shelf” HRM bundles of practices are inadequate. Like Paauwe, 2004 we
would argue that our findings reiterate the need for HR practitioners to become more
embedded in their organizations’ strategic processes so that their offerings are more
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strategically integrated. This means that HR practitioners, in order to maximise the impact
they can have within their organisations, should not only select but also adapt strategically
relevant HRM practices and thereafter monitor their strategic impact. As such we are arguing
that practitioners allow themselves to become more influenced by configurational approaches
to HRM and, by the same token, abandon universalistic approaches.
Future research on the effects of HRM-practices would arguably profit from being
based on more objective data and more precise modelling. Black and Lynch’s (2001) study of
the effects of workplace practices, human capital investments and information technology on
productivity in US firms by means of an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, may
serve as a model. In addition, merging the survey of US firms with longitudinal data from the
Bureau of Census, enabled Black and Lynch to control for omitted variables and endogeneity
bias. However, the results of their study provided even less support than ours for the notion
that HRM represents a decisive source of enhanced performance.
It may of course be argued, as we ourselves do, that only the more firm-specific
variants of the configurational approach are capable of delineating the performance effects of
HRM in general. That is a configurational approach may be able to identify firm-specific
performance benefits to be derived from collaborative HRM practices. While this is possible
we would emphasize the difficulty in testing such approaches empirically without identifying
sets of firms that share a very broad range of parameters but which differ in terms of their
combinations of HRM-practices. Such an approach is beyond the range of this paper.
Nevertheless, this paper does provide an important contribution to the HRM and performance
debate, through the finding that the role of HRM in performance is less important than other
authors have suggested. In addition, our research suggests that this link is limited to
calculative HRM practices.
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Table 1. The number of firms from each country
Country N %
UK 638 19.5
France 308 9.4
Germany 386 11.8
Sweden 171 5.2
Spain 202 6.2
Denmark 266 8.1
Netherlands 80 2.4
Italy 65 2.0
Ireland 242 7.4
Portugal 116 3.5
Finland 135 4.1
Former GDR 123 3.7
Greece 97 3.0
Austria 135 4.1
Belgium 204 6.2
Northern Ireland 113 3.4
Sum 3281 100.0
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Table 2. Principal Components factoring of HRM Practices into Strategic HR Bundles
in the European Union. Varimax rotation.
Strategic Human Resource
Bundles (Factors)
Human Resource Practices in each
bundle
Factor
loadings
1. Training monitoring Analyze employee training needs 0.449
Eigenvalue after rotation: 3.51 Monitor effectiveness of training 0.880
Variance explained (%): 5.76 Evaluate training through learning 0.502
Evaluate training through behaviours 0.827
Evaluate training through results 0.762
Evaluate training through reactions 0.846
2. Share-Options
Offer employee share options for
management 0.782
Eigenvalue after rotation: 3.32
Offer employee share options for
professional staff 0.941
Variance explained (%): 5.44
Offer employee share options for clerical
staff 0.952
Offer employee share options for manual
staff 0.898
3. Evaluation of HR Dept.
Performance of HR dept. evaluated on a
systematic basis 0.842
Eigenvalue after rotation: 3.28
Views of top management taken into
account for evaluation 0.822
Variance explained (%): 5.38
Views of line management taken into
account for evaluation 0.810
Employee views taken into account for
evaluation 0.733
Human resource managers’ views taken into
account for evaluation 0.716
4. Profit-Sharing Offer profit sharing options for management 0.814
Eigenvalue after rotation: 3.25
Offer profit sharing options for professional
staff 0.928
Variance explained (%): 5.34 Offer profit sharing options for clerical staff 0.930
Offer profit sharing options for manual staff 0.869
5. Group-Bonus Offer group bonus for management 0.728
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.69 Offer group bonus for professional staff 0.883
Variance explained (%): 4.41 Offer group bonus for clerical staff 0.888
Offer group bonus for manual staff 0.716
6. Performance-related pay Performance-related pay for management 0.655
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.50
Performance-related pay for professional
staff 0.861
Variance explained (%): 4.10 Performance-related pay for clerical staff 0.876
Performance-related pay for manual staff 0.677
7. Joint HR-line mgt
responsibility
Responsibility is joint between HR and line
management for:
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.40 Compensation and benefits 0.688
Variance explained (%): 3.93 Recruitment and selection 0.750
Training and development 0.717
Industrial relations 0.537
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Staff reduction/expansion 0.666
8. Communication on
Strategy Professional staff briefed about strategy 0.748
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.29 Clerical staff briefed about strategy 0.890
Variance explained (%): 3.76 Manual staff briefed about strategy 0.854
9. Communication on
Finance Professional staff briefed about finance 0.766
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.27 Clerical staff briefed about finance 0.850
Variance explained (%): 3.72 Manual staff briefed about strategy finance 0.812
10. Employee involvement Communication through team briefings 0.634
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.25
Employee ideas communicated directly to
senior management 0.613
Variance explained (%): 3.69
Employee ideas communicated through the
immediate supervisor 0.613
Employee ideas communicated through
workforce meetings 0.606
Employee ideas communicated through the
use of team briefings 0.714
11. Communication on
organization of work
Professional staff briefed about organization
of work 0.688
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.20
Clerical staff briefed about organization of
work 0.791
Variance explained (%): 3.60
Manual staff briefed about strategy
organization of work 0.843
12. Career development Regularly use formal career plans 0.559
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.18 Regularly use succession plans 0.488
Variance explained (%): 3.57 Regularly use planned job rotation 0.540
Regularly use high flier schemes 0.714
Regularly use international experience
schemes 0.657
13. Wider-jobs Jobs made wider for management 0.708
Eigenvalue after rotation: 2.16 Jobs made wider for professional staff 0.777
Variance explained (%): 3.54 Jobs made wider for clerical staff 0.746
Jobs made wider for manual staff 0.616
14. Communication to
management Management briefed about strategy 0.551
Eigenvalue after rotation: 1.87 Management briefed about finance 0.681
Variance explained (%): 3.07
Management briefed about organization of
work 0.631
15. Downsizing methods Staff decreased by voluntary redundancy 0.741
Eigenvalue after rotation: 1.62 Staff decreased by redeployment 0.734
Variance explained (%): 2.65 Outsourcing used instead of staff reduction 0.650
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Table 3. Logistic regression analysis of 15 HR-bundles on firm performance (N=3,281). a
Calculative bundles B S.E. Sig. Exp(B)
1. Training monitoring 0.117 0.042 0.006 1.124
2. Share-options 0.231 0.039 0.000 1.260
3. Evaluation of HR Dept. 0.163 0.039 0.000 1.177
4. Profit-sharing 0.273 0.043 0.000 1.314
5. Group-bonus 0.229 0.040 0.000 1.258
6. Performance related pay 0.073 0.040 0.065 1.076
Collaborative bundles
7. Joint HR-Mgt 0.057 0.039 0.148 1.058
8. Communication on strategy -0.051 0.039 0.198 0.951
9. Communication on finance 0.024 0.041 0.565 1.024
10. Employee involvement -0.009 0.041 0.833 0.991
11. Communication on organisation of work -0.037 0.039 0.342 0.963
14. Communication to management 0.058 0.040 0.149 1.060
Intermediary bundles
12. Career development 0.192 0.041 0.000 1.211
13. Wider-jobs 0.075 0.039 0.055 1.078
15. Downsizing methods -0.153 0.042 0.000 0.858
Contingency variables
Lnsize 0.194 0.036 0.000 1.214
Price important -0.290 0.080 0.000 0.748
Quality important 0.298 0.110 0.007 1.347
Growing market 0.325 0.080 0.000 1.384
Percent unionized -0.002 0.002 0.346 0.999
R2 (Cox & Snell): 0.143
Marginal effects on R2 of: b
Controls:
Industry 0.012
Country 0.043
Contingency variables 0.019
Calculative practices 0.032
Collaborative and Intermediary practices 0.012
a Binary logistic regression analysis. Results for the control variables, industry, numerical
flexibility, and country, are not reported in the Table.
b Marginal effects are estimated as the increment in the R2 by added each set of variables as a
second block to the rest of the variables.
